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in the one person, what is predicable of Christ is predicable of him both as God and as man. This is why so much stress was laid on the epithet *Theotokos*. Those who refused it to Christ's mother were held to deny that it can properly be said that "God was born," "God died for us," and the like, and so to be denying the reality of the Incarnation. Hence, as it seems to me, the expression in Watts's well-known hymn, "the death of Christ my God" is, as one would expect, literally and exactly correct from the standpoint of dogmatic orthodoxy. It is Miss Gardner who is technically unorthodox in defending it as devout but inaccurate rhetoric.

If I may make one further critical observation on a book which I have read with much quiet pleasure, I would suggest that Miss Gardner, addressing a public not composed exclusively of specialists in history, should hardly have spoken of "law-givers like Solon and Demonax" without explaining who that not very familiar person Demonax was. That explanation is not superfluous I can testify, for I myself on first reading took the allusion to be to the fairly well-known Cynic moralist admired by Lucian, and caught myself wondering why the writer called him a law-giver. It was only after a little puzzling that I remembered Herodotus's narrative of the troubles of Cyrene and so found the key to the riddle.

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PRAGMATISM AND IDEALISM. By William Caldwell, M.A., D.Sc.
London: A. & C. Black, 1913. Pp. x, 268.

"What is attempted in this book is an examination of the pragmatist philosophy in its relations to older and newer tendencies in the thought and practice of mankind" (p. v). A statement of the positions of Peirce, James, Schiller, and Dewey, with regard to propagandist pragmatism (Ch. I), is followed by an account of pragmatic tendencies in the works of thinkers, most of whom do not profess the pragmatic faith, or, at least, are not known primarily as pragmatists (Ch. II). Professor Caldwell, in search of adherents to pragmatism, examines briefly some salient characteristics of a very extensive range of literature. After having indicated the widespread favor accorded to pragmatistical principles,—writers mentioned in this

connection ranging from Sigwart, Harnack, and James Ward, to Jerusalem, M. Faguet, Eleutheropolos, and Harold Begbie,—the author proceeds (1) to enumerate the fundamental characteristics of pragmatism (Ch. III), dealing separately (Ch. IV) with its relations to human activity, and (2) to offer a number of criticisms of this philosophy. (It is questioned on p. 161 whether pragmatism can be called a *philosophy* at all.) In this connection there is a chapter entitled “Pragmatism as Americanism.” The author tells us in the preface (p. vi) that this chapter is “offered with some degree of reservation and mis-giving,” but perhaps it is the most interesting in the book. There is also a chapter on “Pragmatism and Anglo-Hegelian Idealism,” which is an analysis and criticism of Professor Bosanquet’s first volume of recent Gifford lectures. Finally, there is a discussion of the relations of pragmatism to the philosophy of Bergson.

This brief survey of Professor Caldwell’s book is sufficient to indicate that the treatment of pragmatism that is to be found within its pages is of a very general character. In fact, the book is simply a panorama view of much of the thinking world, which the author has been regarding chiefly with the purpose of noting its pragmatistical characteristics. The consequent form of the book constitutes at once its merits and its defects. To the microscopic philosopher, who is bent on the solution of some technical problem, it will bring the suggestion of the comprehensiveness of the interests of thinking humanity; and it will afford him a useful outline of the extent of the advocacy of the contentions with which it deals. Just because it does these things, it fails in detailed analysis and exact appreciation,—which seem at the present day to be what philosophy most needs. Indeed, many of its analyses and criticisms are of so very abstract a character as to render it practically useless, except for beginners. Professor Caldwell’s aim, however, was to write something far more important than an “Introduction to Pragmatism.”

The character of generality in statement and criticism may be illustrated by reference to what seem, to Professor Caldwell, some of the fundamental features of pragmatism. Such are: (1) All truth is “made” truth, and there is no “objective” or “independent” truth (p. 59); (2) Belief is fundamental to life (p. 64); (3) Philosophy must deal with man in the con-

crete (p. 68); (4) Man is not merely, nor primarily, an intellectual being (p. 73).

It would be very interesting to know precisely what any one of the above statements means. Yet Professor Caldwell talks about them in a highly abstract manner, and, as a rule, substitutes addition for definition of terms. What, *e. g.*, does pragmatism mean when it asserts, according to Professor Caldwell, that all truth is "made" truth, that there is no "objective" or "independent" truth? Does it mean that, unless there were people who made assertions, there would be no truth, since only an assertion can be true? If it does not mean this, what exactly does it mean? Again, what is meant when it is said that "belief is fundamental to life"? Is it meant that only a strong conviction, which need not be knowledge, is required to support a martyr on the rack? It surely does not mean that no man can live unless he has some particular belief, *e. g.*, that in the existence of a personal God, or that in the objectivity of right and wrong. But what then does it mean? The fact is that the proposition, "Belief is fundamental to life," is as abstract a statement as can well be made. The doctrine thus expressed is, we are told, fundamental in pragmatism. Yet pragmatism is itself continually denouncing abstractions. Professor Caldwell is of opinion that pragmatism is right in its criticism of abstractionism, and urges a similar criticism against Bosanquet and Anglo-Hegelian Idealism. It would therefore have been more consistent with his professions, as well as more useful, if Professor Caldwell had taken some care to reduce his own, and pragmatism's, highly abstract statements on the above points to the concrete. Similar remarks apply to the greater part of Professor Caldwell's book.

In the chapter on "Pragmatism as Americanism," the question discussed is the extent to which pragmatism is an expression of American life and thought. From what we are told, we judge that an American professor gathers his classes by the attractiveness of his subject and method, and that the specially attractive manner in which pragmatism was lectured on by James, accounts, to a considerable extent, for the number of adherents it gained in American colleges (pp. 173-76). Professor Caldwell does not think it an advantage however, that philosophy should compete in universities with other courses of study, as if all subjects were on a level. "Philosophy . . .

is the universal study that gives to all other studies and pursuits their relative place and value" (p. 187). (This, by the way, is hardly consistent with Professor Caldwell's frequent utterances to the effect that persons and not theories give things their values. For what becomes of this contention if persons are not to be allowed to appreciate the comparative values of courses of study at a university?) Again, Americans are practical, and they are attracted by the concrete; pragmatism, as a protest against abstractionism, thus appealed to them (p. 176). Further, the "complex and amalgam-like character of pragmatism" is supposed to reflect the "thoroughly eclectic and composite character of its (America's) general culture and the tone of its public life" (p. 177). "As a juxtaposition, or kind of compound solution, of such a variety of things as the affirmations of religion, the hypothetical method of science, realism, romanticism, idealism, utilitarianism, and so on, it reminds us only too forcibly of the endless number of social groups and traditions, the endless number of interests and activities and projects to be seen and felt in any large American city" (pp. 171 *f.*). Finally, the bent of Americans towards action and accomplishment is expressed in pragmatism's insistence on conduct and efficiency (p. 178). Professor Caldwell thinks, however, that pragmatism is not merely Americanism. The opportunism of pragmatism, it is maintained, seems to be absent from the best American thought, though, at the same time, the American is essentially experimental in ethics.

Apart from the fact that the author's criticisms are very abstract, they appear to be often somewhat arbitrary. There is a decided strain of eclecticism in Professor Caldwell. He is a theistic idealist (p. 199, *note*), and a Kantian (p. 11, *note*). Fundamentally, he is an idealist (*vide passim*: the point of the name of the book appears to be that it gives an idealist's account of pragmatism), and his various criticisms, of pragmatism, of realism, and of other theories, always rest upon some idealistic doctrine, the one most often mentioned being the doctrine that there is no 'object' without a 'subject.' This doctrine is not argued; but it so frequently constitutes the foundation of Professor Caldwell's statements, that, if it were false, these statements would be quite invalid. It is, therefore, worth mentioning that this very doctrine is being more and more questioned at the present day. We would suppose that Pro-

fessor Caldwell establishes it by the inconceivability argument, though of this we are doubtful, since he never does more than assert the doctrine, and, in addition, he accuses Bosanquet of reaching unjustifiable conclusions by means of "inconceivability" (p. 232). But if the doctrine is not established by the inconceivability argument, it is difficult to see how anyone can be so sure of it as Professor Caldwell seems to be.

The fact that Professor Caldwell is fundamentally an idealist,—whatever be his arguments for the "permanent element of truth in idealism" (p. 226),—makes him somewhat unfair to other theories. He seems utterly incapable of recognizing any truth in realism. He often qualifies a theory as 'realistic,' and apparently thinks that nothing worse could be said of it. This procedure is merely an instance of the aristocratic manner of idealists with other thinkers. They say to them, in effect: "My dear sirs, your theories are crude and superficial; they are not worthy to be called philosophy." Thus we read, *e. g.*, of Stein, that "his tendency . . . is realistic and naturalistic and evolutionistic, and he thinks (for a philosopher) far too much of men like Herbert Spencer and Mach and Ostwald" (p. 39, *note*). Again, we read that 'new realism' is a "doctrine whose unmitigated externalism is the negation of all philosophy" (p. 54, *note*). How can a student of *philosophy* make a remark such as this? A theory other than a philosopher's own may, of course, be *false*; but what possible justification has he for branding it unphilosophic? The tendency to make such qualifications needs to be tempered by that very democratic spirit in philosophy, which Professor Caldwell, elsewhere in his book (p. 185), commended in pragmatism. And after positively forbidding philosophy, on pain of losing its name, to be realistic, it is somewhat inconsistent to quarrel with writers who "debar philosophy from the study of such a practical thing as the Americanism of to-day" (p. 169, 70). For if one point of view is outside the sphere of philosophy, why not several? Yet Mr. Bertrand Russell is hauled over the coals for "the prejudice that philosophy is at its best only when occupied with studies which (like the mathematics of his affections) are as remote as possible from human life" (p. 169, *note*). Professor Caldwell has no logical ground for complaint here, since the position is strictly analogous to his own, namely, that philosophy is at its best only when it is a certain kind of idealism. These

inconsistencies in criticism savour of a harmful kind of eclecticism.

Throughout the book, perhaps the most frequently stated criticism is that some position or other is 'unintelligible.' It is apparently supposed that if any position is 'unintelligible,' the propositions that are used to state it are false; that any position is refuted if it is shown to be 'unintelligible.' Without denying that this is so, the question is pertinent whether any single philosopher uses 'unintelligible' in any defined sense, and, in particular, what is meant by Professor Caldwell when he states that some theory is 'unintelligible.' Does he mean that that theory is self-contradictory? Does he mean that it is inconceivable, and if so, what is meant by 'inconceivable'? The time seems to have come when we should demand from those who use this form of criticism some strict account of it. Such an account may be forthcoming; but would it not be better to use a less ambiguous term of criticism, one also that has less psychological reference?

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LA PHILOSOPHIE ET LA SOCIOLOGIE D'ALFRED FOUILLÉE. Par Augustin Guyau. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1913. Pp. xix, 243.

The brief biography which introduces this volume is written by the widow of the philosopher, while the book itself is a tribute of filial piety. Its author is his grandson and pupil, the son of his more famous pupil Jean-Marie Guyau. Its summary of Fouillée's philosophy is based on extracts and summaries which he had himself prepared for the author's use in study, on conversations with him, and on notes and fragments left among his papers, as well as on his published writings. It may therefore be considered as in a measure an independent source of information concerning its subject.

The work is purely expository. Judgment and criticism are excluded by the purpose of M. Guyau, which was, as he says, to make himself "an echo." He has succeeded admirably in his modest but difficult *rôle*. Fouillée, despite the difficulties of impaired vision and ill health, under which he labored for the greater part of his life, was a voluminous author. The bibliography which closes this volume enumerates thirty-two